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I. Introduction
The year 2004 witnessed significant developments in the international trade arena. Mul-
tilateral negotiations, including the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) steel negotiations,
and the Free Trade of the Americas' negotiations, either faltered or ground to a halt in
2004. Meanwhile, there was a frenzy of bilateral negotiations, with countries around the
world competing to enter into as many free trade agreements (FTA) as possible.
Dispute settlement at the WTO continued to be dominated by sparring between the
United States and the European Communities, with new controversies over aircraft and
agricultural subsidies adding some spice to the usual mix of antidumping and countervailing
duty cases. U.S. trade remedy litigation reflected the continuation of old disputes (e.g.,
softwood lumber) and growing concerns over Chinese imports in all economic sectors.
On the legislative front, Congress was unusually active, implementing legislation for two
FTAs, repealing other legislation to comply with WTO rulings, and acting on long-delayed
legislation, such as the miscellaneous tariff bill.
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The Kingdom of Nepal joined the WTO as its 147th Member on April 23, 2004.1
Cambodia later became the 148th Member on October 13, 2004, after a ten-year long
accession process.2 Laos and Libya began the long journey towards becoming WTO mem-
bers in 2004, while Vietnam, Russia, and Saudi Arabia's accession negotiations reportedly
made significant progress.
2. Doha Round Negotiations
In the wake of the failed Cancun Ministerial, the Doha Round negotiations seemed to
be in jeopardy. In 2004, however, the Members of the WTO appeared more willing to
make the commitments and sacrifices necessary for the negotiation of a comprehensive
framework agreement. The deadlock in Cancun had impeded the resolution of key mo-
dalities, particularly agreements on (1) a date and a technical approach for implementing
cuts in agricultural subsidies and (2) on how to proceed with the four Singapore issues
(facilitation, investment, competition, and transparency in government procurement).
To help overcome this deadlock, the United States signaled its willingness to take the
other Singapore issues off the table if trade facilitation could be negotiated within the
framework agreement.3 The United States reiterated its commitment to the elimination of
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and barriers to market access.4 But the European
Community (EC) announced that it would only eliminate export subsidies on non-sensitive
commodities, which would exclude sugar, dairy, and beef from such cuts. The EC was
willing to agree to the elimination of export subsidies only if the end date was determined
at a later point in time.'
In August 2004, WTO members agreed on a framework for concluding the Doha Round
of the multilateral talks. 6 The text of the new framework, although still ambiguous on many
critical points, included narrowing the Singapore issues to trade facilitation, deepened com-
mitment to reducing agricultural production subsidies, elimination of agricultural export
subsidies (with no end date specified), and a commitment to deal with cotton subsidies.7
Notably, the General Council agreed to a framework for establishing modalities in ag-
riculture. Furthermore, the framework provided guidance on the "three pillars" of agri-
cultural trade-domestic support, export subsidies, and market access.8
1. Understanding the WTO, Members and Observers, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 12, 2005).
2. Id.
3. Zoellick Presses for Geneva Meeting To Reach Framework Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 2004, at § 8,
available at 2004 WVLNR 73074 [hereinafter Zoellick Presses].
4. United States Trade Representative, Pressing Forward in the WTO-The President's 2004 Trade Policy
Agenda (March 1, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/WTO/Pressing-Forward-in-theWTO---The-
President's 2004-Trade-PolicyAgenda.html.
5. Zoellick Presses, supra note 3.
6. World Trade Organization General Council, Doha Work Programme, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004), available
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Doha Work Programme].
7. Id.
8. Id. at Annex A, 14.
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First, with regard to domestic support, members with more developed economies agreed
on a tiered formula to deepen cuts in permitted trade-distorting domestic support and to
major reductions in the overall level of trade-distorting support from bound levels. Under
this formula, members with higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support will make
greater overall reductions in order to achieve harmonization.' 0
In addition, the framework placed a cap on "blue box" spending, generally considered
less trade-distorting. The framework, however, redefines "blue box" spending to include
domestic support not tied to limits on production or an obligation to produce but based
on fixed bases and yields." This redefinition would cover both direct payments as well as
U.S countercycical payments that compensate U.S. farmers for downturns in global com-
modity prices, thereby ensuring that these subsidies will not be subject to substantial re-
ductions. 2 At the request of the G-20, an alliance of developing countries led by Brazil,
China, and India, WTO members agreed to review and clarify the criteria for "green box"
subsidies, which may lead to new disciplines for this category of domestic support. 3
The framework recognized Special and Differential treatment as an integral component
of domestic support, but seemed to distinguish between developing countries based on their
allocations of domestic support.' 4 Developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis
support for subsistence and poor farmers will be exempt from commitments to reduce such
de minimis support. This language implies that countries such as Brazil and Argentina that
do not allocate most domestic subsidies to subsistence farmers may have to reduce their de
minimis support.'5
Second, with regard to export subsidies, members agreed to work toward the elimination
of all forms of export subsidies and export measures with equivalent effect by an unspecified
date.' 6 Third, with regard to market access, members agreed on a tiered formula for tariff
reductions that takes into account the different tariff structures of members. This agreement
furthers the objective of tariff reduction while respecting the limitations of developing
countries, which is consistent with the Doha mandate. 7 Finally, although much progress
was made with respect to agriculture, no significant progress was made in regard to non-
agricultural market access, services, trade facilitation, and rules.
B. OECD STEEL NEGOTIATIONS
The OECD steel negotiations, which had as their objective the elimination of all trade-
distorting subsidies to the steel sector, grounded to a halt in 2004. The negotiations floun-
9. Id. at Annex A, 6.
10. Id. at Annex A, 7.
11. Id. at Annex A, IT 13-15.
12. "Blue box" subsidies are those subsidies that are tied to programs that limit production. G-20 to Press
for New Disciplines on Direct Payments in WTO Farm Talks, 21 Irr'L T E REP. (BNA), No. 46, at 1852
(Nov. 18, 2004).
13. Doha Work Programme, supra note 6, at Annex A, 9116.
14. Id. at Annex A, 16.
15. The United States has indicated that it supports subjecting countries that are competitive in agricultural
exports to tougher rules than less-advanced developing countries not competitive in agriculture. Figbt Looming
Over Claims on Framezwork's Treatmentjfor Brazil, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 20, 2004, at § 8, available at 2004
WLNR 68904; Johnson Says Brazil, Argentina Must Accept Different S&D Treatment, INSIDE U.S. TADE, Sept.
17, 2004, at § 38, available at 2004 WLNR 70407.
16. Doba Work Programme, supra note 6, at Annex A, 1 17.
17. Id. at Annex A, 128.
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dered over disagreements on what types of subsidies should still be permitted under the
agreement. The United States supported a broad prohibition with only a narrow exception
for the elimination of existing capacity. But the European Union (EU) and others wanted
to include additional exceptions for environmental improvements and research and devel-
opment. Furthermore, they favored exempting permitted subsidies from countervailing
duty and antidumping investigations. The United States strongly opposed the inclusion of
these provisions in the final agreement.'8
C. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
1. Free Trade of the Americas
No significant progress was made in the negotiations for a Free Trade of the Americas
Agreement (FTAA) in 2004. The negotiations grounded to a halt due to differences be-
tween the United States and Brazil over a host of issues, including intellectual property
rights, agricultural subsidies, and market access. 19
2. Other Free Trade Agreements
As of January 1, 2004, the United States had implemented five bilateral and regional
FTAs: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Jordan Free Trade Agree-
ment, the Israel Free Trade Agreement, the Chile Free Trade Agreement, and the Singapore
Free Trade Agreement. In addition, the United States was in the process of negotiating
four other FTAs: the South African Customs Union (SACU) with Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland; the Australia Free Trade Agreement; the Morocco
Free Trade Agreement; and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which
included Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
In 2004, the United States initiated negotiations on four additional bilateral and regional
FTAs: the Bahrain Free Trade Agreement; the Andean Free Trade Agreement with Co-
lombia, Peru, and Ecuador; the Thailand Free Trade Agreement; and the Panama Free
Trade Agreement.2 0 The United States also initiated negotiations with the Dominican Re-
public to become part of CAFTA (CAFTA-DR).
By the end of 2004, the United States had completed negotiations on the Australia FTA,
the Morocco FTA, the Bahrain FTA, and the CAFTA-DR. In 2004, Congress passed
implementing legislation for the Morocco FTA and for the Australia FTA.2' But, Congress
took no action on either the Bahrain FTA or the CAFTA-DR. While there was strong
support in Congress for the Bahrain FTA, there was also vehement opposition to the
CAFTA-DR due to its provisions on textiles, sugar, and other agricultural products."
18. Aldonas Says Steel Talks May Have Gone As Far As Possible In OECD, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 23, 2004,
at § 17, available at 2004 WLNR 77989; Countries Agree To Shelve Formal OECD Steel Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
June 18, 2004.
19. U.S., Brazil Take Steps Toward Reviving FTAA Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 17, 2004, § 51,
available at 2004 WLNR 14261081.
20. The United States also initiated and completed negotiations with Uruguay on a bilateral investment
treaty in 2004. Lack Of Investment Treaty Visa Rules Sparks Business Complaints, Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 26, 2004,
§ 48, available at 2004 VvLNR 12408907.
21. The Australia FTA entered into force on January 1, 2005, but the Morocco Free Trade Agreement had
yet to take effect by the end of 2004.
22. CAFTA Opponents Spearhead Dual Congressional Lobbying Strategy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 3, 2004, § 49,
available at 2004 WLNR 12969992; Zoellick Says CAFTA Approval Less Likely This Year Than Other FTAs, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 3, 2004, § 10, available at 2004 WLNR 73857.
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In 2005, the United States will initiate negotiations for FfAs with Oman and the United
Arab Emirates. In addition, the United States will continue its negotiations on the FTAA,
the SACU, the Andean ETA, the Thailand FTA, and the Panama FTA. Many observers
predict that the Panama FTA, the Andean FTA, the Oman FTA, the United Arab Emirates
FTA, and the Thailand FTA will all be concluded by the end of the year. The outcome for
the SACU remains in doubt. 3
Il. WTO Dispute Settlement
A. CONSULTATIONS
1. Successful Consultations
The consultative mechanism yielded two successes in 2004. In July, the United States
and China announced that they had resolved their dispute in China-Value-Added Tax on
Integrated Circuits, in which the United States alleged that China subjected imported in-
tegrated circuits to higher taxes than domestic integrated circuits.24 China agreed to elim-
inate the availability of Value-Added Tax refunds to domestic producers by April 1, 2005.25
In October, the EC and India announced that they had resolved their dispute in European
Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Flat Rolled Iron or Non-alloy Steel
Products from India, in which India alleged that the EC had made a finding of injury on
steel products from India, Egypt, Slovakia, Turkey, Libya, Iran, and Hungary, but had only
imposed antidumping duties on Indian steel products." The terms of the settlement agree-
ment were not made public. 7
2. New Disputes
The cases filed in 2004 reflected the continuing predominance of U.S.-EC disputes and
antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) disputes. In United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, the EC requested consultations
with Canada and the United States regarding their continued suspension of concessions
and other obligations, in European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones). The EC argued that the United States and Canada should have
lifted their tariffs after the EC notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in October
2003 that it had implemented legislation removing the measures at issue.2" The United
23. Zoellick Suggests Deputy Minister Mechanism To Restart SACU FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 24, 2004,
§ 52, available at 2004 WLNR 14632678.
24. Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/
DS309/1 (March 23, 2004).
25. Joint Communication from China and the United States, China- Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits,
WT/DS309/7 (July 16, 2004).
26. Request for Consultations by India, European Communities-Anti-dumping Duties on Certain Flat Rolled
Iron or Non-alloy Steel Products from India, WT/DS313/1 (July 8, 2004).
27. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities-Anti-dumping Duties on Certain Flat
Rolled Iron or Non-alloy Steel Products from India, WTIDS313/2 (October 27, 2004).
28. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/1 (October 11, 2004); Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/1
(October 11, 2004); EUNotifies WTO of Change In Hormone Ban, Argues It Is In Compliance, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Oct. 31, 2003, Issue 44, available at 2003 WLNR 96039.
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States and Canada stated that the replacement legislation did not implement the DSB's
recommendations.
29
In December, the long-running U.S.-EC dispute over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers
finally reached the V-TO, with both the United States and the EC filing requests for
consultations.3 0 But on January 11, 2005, the parties agreed to a three-month truce during
which they attempted to negotiate a comprehensive agreement ending the subsidies at issue.
It appeared likely that the WTO litigation would be revived if the negotiations failed to
produce a satisfactory settlement.31
The respondent in most AD/CVD cases continued to be the United States. In United
States-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, Japan challenged the U.S. prac-
tice of zeroing negative dumping margins, the presumptions used in sunset reviews, and
waiver provisions that appeared to require the finding of a likelihood of recurrence of
dumping.32 Similarly, in United States-Provisional Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp
from Thailand, Thailand challenged the U.S. practice of zeroing negative dumping margins
and the use of "adverse facts available." 3 In United States-Section 776 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, the EC challenged the United States for (1) its refusal to verify data submitted by
the target company or to use that data in determining the margin of dumping; (2) its use
of an "adverse inference" in the selection of available facts; and (3) its reliance on infor-
mation contained in the complaint for the establishment of the margin of dumping and
antidumping duty.3
4
B. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
1. Disputes under the Antidumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreements
a. Softwood Lumber
The long-running dispute between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber
generated three Panel and Appellate Body Reports in 2004. In January, the Appellate Body
issued a mixed ruling regarding the U.S. Department of Commerce's (DOC) final deter-
mination of subsidization.3 The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's decision that Canada's
stumpage fees for trees coming from government-owned land may constitute a financial
29. U.S. Rejects EU Pledge Of Compliance In Beef Hormone Dispute, INSmE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 2003, Issue
46, available at 2003 VVLNR 87370.
30. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1 (Dec. 10, 2004); Request for Consultations by the United States, European
Communities and Certain Member States-MeasuresAffecting Trade in Large CivilAircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Dec. 10,
2004).
31. U.S., EU Face Major Hurdle On IdentifyingAircraft Subsidies Under Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,Jan. 14,2005,
§ 2, available at 2005 VLNR 534884.
32. Request for Consultations by Japan, United States-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/
DS322/1 (Nov. 29, 2004).
33. Request for Consultations by Thailand, United States-Provisional Anti-Dumping Measures on Sbrimp
from Tbailand, WT/DS324/1 (Dec. 14, 2004).
34. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Section 776 of tbe TariffAct of
1930, VV T/DS319/1 (Sept. 11, 2004).
35. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination Witb Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumberfrom Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).
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contribution16 But it reversed the Panel's finding regarding the appropriate benchmark to
be used to measure the benefit provided."
While the Panel declared that an investigating authority was required to measure stump-
age fees against private prices in the country of origin, the Appellate Body adopted a dif-
ferent test when the investigating authority establishes that the market in the exporting
country is distorted by the government's predominant role in the scrutinized market. In
such cases, an investigating body may use reference or benchmark prices other than those
prevalent in the subsidizing country to determine the benefit." Despite this change, the
Appellate Body did not determine that the comparison price applied by the DOC in this
case conformed to the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures (Sc Agreement). 9
In March, a Panel reviewing the U.S. International Trade Commission's (ITC) injury
determination held that the ITC's finding of a "likely imminent substantial increase in
imports" did not meet the objectivity standard required from an investigating authority. 40
The Panel held that it must be "clear from the determination that the investigating authority
has evaluated how the future will be different from the immediate past, such that the sit-
uation of no present material injury will change in the imminent future to a situation of
material injury, in the absence of measures." 41 The Panel also declared that in failing to
meet this standard, the ITC's determination was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
In April, a different Panel upheld the legitimacy of the DOC's antidumping duties, but
held that its method of calculating dumping margins using zeroing was inconsistent with
article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 4 In August, the Appellate Body upheld the
Panel's majority decision on zeroing.4
b. United States-Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Argentina
In July 2004, a Panel issued a mixed ruling regarding an expedited DOC sunset review
of an antidumping duty order covering oil country tubular goods from Argentina.- The
Panel held that section 75 1(c)(4)(B) of the 1930 Tariff Act regarding affirmative waivers,
certain sections of the DOC's Regulations regarding deemed waivers, and section ll.A.3 of
the Sunset Policy Bulletin were inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the
other hand, the Panel found that sections 752(a)(1) and (5) of the Tariff Act that deal with
the likelihood of injury recurrence, were not inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agree-
36. Id. at 66.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 67.
40. Panel Report, United States-Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumberfrom
Canada, 121, WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004).
41. Id. at 99.
42. Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on SoftwoodLumberfrom Canada, WT/DS264/
R (Apr. 13, 2004).
43. Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS 141/AB/RW (Apr. 8, 2003).
44. Panel Report, United States-Sunset Reviews ofAnti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goodsfrom
Argentina, WTDS268/R (July 16, 2004).
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ment.4' The Panel also found that certain actions of the DOC and the ITC were not
inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.
After the United States and Argentina appealed the Panel decision, the Appellate Body
reversed the Panel's characterization of section I.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin as in-
consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 46 The Appellate Body found the Panel did
not "make an objective assessment of the matter" as required by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. But the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's findings of inconsistency re-
garding the sections of the Tariff Act and the DOC's Regulations.
47
c. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton
In the first major ruling on the Peace Clause, 4 the Panel found that the U.S. export
credit guarantee programs and a category of Step 2 marketing payments offered to exporters
were prohibited export subsidies under articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.49
The Panel found a causal link between certain U.S. price-contingent payments and signifi-
cant price suppression of cotton on the world market. But the Panel did not find a causal
link regarding U.S. non-price contingent payments, including the production-based Prod-
uct Flexibility Contracts, Direct Payments, and crop insurance subsidies. The Panel ruled
that the price-contingent payments were trade-distorting domestic subsidies that did not
qualify as "green box" subsidies.50 The Panel recommended that the prohibited cotton
subsidies be withdrawn "without delay.""' The United States appealed the Panel Report.5"
And the Appellate Body delayed its report until March 2005.11
2. Other Disputes
a. Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services
In April 2004, the Panel held that Mexico acted inconsistently with its commitments
under section 2.2(b) of a 1996 WTO Reference Paper that was incorporated into Mexico's
commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and into Mexican
law, by failing to ensure its major telecommunications supplier issued cost-oriented rates.
s4
The Panel found that Mexico failed to maintain "appropriate measures" to prevent anti-
competitive practices as mandated by the Reference Paper. 5 The Panel also found that
45. Id. at 80-81.
46. Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Reviews ofAnti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004).
47. Id. at 134.
48. Until January 2004, article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture (the "Peace Clause") protected most
agricultural subsidies from dispute settlement challenges, provided that those subsidies did not exceed the
agreed ceilings.
49. Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 262-329 WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
50. Id. at 102. The fundamental requirement for a measure to qualify for "green box" treatment is that it
must have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting or production-related effects.
51. Id. at 350.
52. Appeal Notification, United States-Subsidieson Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/17 (Oct. 20, 2004).
53. Appellate Body Communication, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/18 (Dec.
20, 2004).
54. Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, VWT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004). This
dispute arose out of the difficulties experienced by two U.S. telecommunications providers in competition with
the dominant Mexican telecommunications provider.
55. Id. at 76.
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Mexico failed to meet its obligations under sections 5(a) and (b) of the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications by failing to ensure access to telecommunications networks on rea-
sonable terms by U.S. service providers.6 The Panel found no violation of sections 2.2(b),
5(a), or 5(b) of the Reference Paper regarding cross-border supply.57
This decision marks the first time that a WTO Panel has concluded that the inadequacy
of a member's antitrust measures is a violation of its VTO commitments. 8 The United
States and Mexico subsequently reached an agreement resolving their differences.19 Mexico
agreed to allow foreign carriers to (1) negotiate their own rates with Mexican carriers for
completing calls into the Mexican market ° and (2) offer long-distance services by first
buying minutes from telecommunications companies that have networks in Mexico, and
then reselling those minutes through pre-paid phone cards and other means. 61
b. United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services
Antigua challenged U.S. measures that prohibited Antiguan-based firms from providing
U.S.-based customers with Internet gambling services. 6 The Panel held that the United
States' Schedule under the GATS included specific commitments on gambling services, and
that in order to satisfy the necessity test of article XIV the United States had to assess the
availability of WTO-consistent alternatives before enacting the prohibition.61 The Panel
emphasized that V/TO members have a right to regulate, and even prohibit, gambling
activities, but that the U.S. prohibition was not consistent with the WTO.6 The Panel
acknowledged that the United States may not have intended to make the commitments at
issue, but held that the Panel was required to interpret and apply the law, not to second-
guess U.S. intentions.6
Furthermore, the Panel found that the restrictions on gambling services served important
interests, but held that the United States was obliged to consider VWTO-consistent alter-
natives through "good faith bilateral or multilateral consultations and/or negotiations with
Antigua" before enacting the prohibition.-6 Because the United States had not engaged in
such consultations and negotiations, the Panel held that the United States failed to dem-
56. Id. at 224-25.
57. Id. at 225.
58. For a discussion regarding the significance of this decision, See Rajeev Sharma & Jason Rosychuk, The
Collision of Trade and Competition Law: Assessing the Aftermath of the W70 Telemex Decision, at 115-17 (July 15,
2004), available at http://www.heenanblaikie.com/en/media/pdfs/pdf/20040625-sharma.pdf.
59. Mexico To Cut Rates, Open Market In Telecom Settlement With U.S, INsIDE U.S. TRoE,Jan. 14,2005, § 23,
available at 2004 WLNR 80791.
60. Previously, the Mexican carrier Telmex negotiated a single rate that all Mexican carriers had to use when
completing calls from the United States.
61. Agreement Notification, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/7/S/L/161
(June 2, 2004).
62. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
63. Id. at 272.
64. Id. at 273.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 261.
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onstrate the necessity of the prohibition, as required under article XIV of the GATS. 67 The
United States has indicated its intention to appeal the decision.
6s
c. Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain
In April 2004, the Panel rejected a U.S. claim that actions by Canada and the Canadian
Wheat Board (CWB) were inconsistent with international rules on state trading enterprises,
but held that the CWB discriminated against imported grain through its policies on railroad
transport fees, grain segregation, and the entry authorization requirement.69 In August, the
Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's decision.70
d. European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries
India challenged the tariff preferences given to certain developing countries under the
EC's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).7' In 2003, a WTO Panel ruled in India's
favor, finding that these additional tariff preferences unfairly discriminated between devel-
oping countries in violation of the most favored nation (MFN) principle under article 1:1
of the GATT. This decision was appealed by the EC.1
In the appeal, the EC argued that the Panel incorrectly concluded that the Special Ar-
rangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking provided in Council Regulation
(EC) No.2501/2001 are inconsistent with article 1:1 of the GAYT. 74 The Panel had found
that the GATT's "Enabling Clause" 5 is an exception to article 1: 1, that the Enabling Clause
does not exclude the applicability of article 1:1, and that the EC had the burden of proving
that the Drug Arrangements were consistent with the Enabling Clause.
76
On April 7, 2004, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's findings on the Enabling
Clause."7 The Enabling Clause requires WTO members to provide "non-reciprocal and
non discriminatory preferences" to developing countries under their GSP schemes.7" How-
67. Article XIV allows restrictions on these grounds provided that they are not applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner or used to cloak restrictions on trade.
68. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Statement from USTR Spokesman Richard Mills
Regarding the WTO Gambling dispute with Antigua and Barbuda (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.
ustr.gov; U.S. Unlikely to Comply with Gambling Ruling Even IfAppeal Fails, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 12, 2004,
§ 46, available at 2004 W-LNR 7635621.
69. Panel Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of "heat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/
DS276/R (Apr. 6, 2004).
70. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain,
73-74, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 30, 2004).
71. The preferences were awarded based on various steps that the countries had taken to combat the traf-
licking and production of illegal drugs.
72. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Coun-
tries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Granting Tariff Preferences].
. 73. Appeal Notification, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of TariffPreferencesto Developing
Countries, WT/DS246/7 (Jan. 8, 2004).
74. Id.
75. GATT, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Coun-
tries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/enabling-e.pdf[here-
inafter Differential].
76. See Granting Tariff Preferences, supra note 72.
77. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Devel-
oping Countries, 76 WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
78. Differential, supra note 75.
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ever, the Appellate Body found that it was incumbent upon India to raise the Enabling
Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with article 1: 1, and interpreted the terms "non
discriminatory" and "developing countries" in a different manner than the Panel.79
e. European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar
On October 15, 2004, a WTO Panel found that the EC had exceeded its scheduled
commitments on sugar exports every year since 1995.80 In addition, the Panel concluded
that the EC acted inconsistently with its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture
by providing export subsidies in excess of its budgetary outlay commitment level of
EUR499.1 million per year.8' As a result of the findings under the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, the Panel declined to rule on claims under the SCM Agreement as it found such a
ruling unnecessary.82 The EC plans to appeal the ruling8s
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Disputes over the implementation of particular Panel and Appellate Body decisions con-
tinue to dominate the DSB agenda. These cases can be grouped into two categories-
disputes over a lack of compliance and disputes over the meaning of compliance.
1. Lack of Compliance
In United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, the United
States failed to repeal the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment),
which mandates the distribution of the antidumping and countervailing duties to companies
that brought or supported AD/CVD petitions, by the December 27, 2003 deadline.4 In
response, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EC, India, Korea, Japan, and Mexico requested au-
thorization to suspend concessions against U.S. products in an amount equal to the amount
of distributions made to U.S. companies. The arbitrator ruled that each complainant could
suspend concessions in an amount equal to 72 percent of the disbursements made with
respect to that country's exports. 8 Two bills are currently pending to repeal the Byrd
Amendment, but Congress has not taken any action on either bill. 86
In United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Section 211), the
United States failed to repeal or amend a law that was found to discriminate against the
79. Id.
80. Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 199, WT/DS265/R (Oct. 15, 2004);
Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 199, WT/DS266/R (Oct. 15, 2004); Panel
Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 199, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 198.
83. See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Panel Finds EU's Sugar Exports Vastly Overstep
WTO Limits, Bridges, Oct. 2004, at 13, available at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/index.htn.
84. Arbitration under Article 21.3(c), United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offiet Act of2000, WT/
DS217/14 (June 13, 2003).
85. Byrd Decision Sides Witb U.S. In Limiting Retaliation To Trade Damage, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 3, 2004,
at § 36, available at 2004 WLNR 69727.
86. United States Status Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offier Act of 2000, WT/
DS217/16/Add. 1I (Dec. 7, 2004); see also Trade Readjustment and Development Enhancement for America's
Communities Act of 2003, S. 1299, 108th Cong. (2003); To Repeal Section 754 of the Tariff Act of 1930, H.R.
3933, 108th Cong. (2004).
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rights of certain nationals in the enforcement of trademark and trade name rights.s7 Four
bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2003 and 2004, but no significant action has
been taken on any of these bills."' The United States and the EC agreed on a compliance
period ending December 31, 2004 that was subsequently extended to June 30, 2005.89
In United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, the United States failed to
repeal or amend the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, which permitted the playing
of radio and television music in public places without paying a royalty fee.9° A temporary
arrangement reached in June 2003, by which the EC received monetary compensation for
the violation, ended on December 20, 2004. By the end of 2004, Congress had taken no
action to change the law.91
2. Meaning of Compliance
In United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," the United States
repealed two laws that were found to provide de facto export subsidies to U.S. exporters.
92
On March 1, 2004, the EC began imposing WTO-authorized 93 ad valorem tariffs on U.S.
products, initially at a rate of 5 percent and increasing 1 percent each month up to a
maximum rate of 17 percent.94 In October 2004, President Bush signed the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, which repealed both the Extraterritorial Income Act (ETI) and its
predecessor, the Foreign Sales Corporation program. 9 In response, the EC lifted the tariffs
effective January 1, 2005. But the EC sought consultations on whether the new law com-
plied with the prior decisions and threatened to reimpose the tariffs as early as January 1,
2006, if a WTO Panel agreed that the new law was WVWO-inconsistent.
96
IV. U.S. Trade Remedy Cases
A. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES
1. Antidumping Cases: Department of Commerce Determinations
In Tung Fong Industrial Co. v. United States, the Court of International Trade (CIT) re-
viewed the DOC's final affirmative antidumping determination regarding stainless steel
87. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/
R (Jan. 1, 2002); Appellate Body and Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DSI76/9 (Feb. 6, 2002).
88. S. 1299, supra note 86; H.R. 3933, supra note 86; Computer Software Privacy and Control Act of 2004,
H.R. 4255, 108th Cong. (2004); A Bill to Modify the Prohibition on Recognition by United States Courts of
Certain Rights Relating to Certain Marks, Trade Names, or Commercial Names, S. 2373, 108th Cong. (2004).
89. Modification of the Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WTIDS176/15 (Dec. 21, 2004).
90. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/8 (July 31, 2000).
91. United States Status Report, United States-Section 110(5) oftthe US CopyrightAct, WT/DS160/24/Add.1
(Dec. 7, 2004).
92. Recourse to Arbitration by the United States, United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations,
WT/DS 108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002); Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, United
States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS 108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002).
93. Recourse by the European Communities, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
WT/DS108/26 (Apr. 25, 2003).
94. EU Slaps U.S. Products With 5 Percent Duty For Failing To Repeal FSC, INSID U.S. TRADE, Mar. 1, 2004.
95. AmericanJobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 101 (2004).
96. EU Approves Regulation Repealing FSC Sanctions, Possibly Reimposing Them, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 21,
2005.
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butt-weld pipe fitting from the Philippines.9 Soon after initiating its investigation, the
DOC learned that the grounds on which it had based the initiation-the petition's assur-
ances that two foreign manufacturers had home market sales at lower prices than sales in
the U.S. market-were false.98 The CIT held that, on remand, the DOC must reconsider
the adequacy of the underlying antidumping duty petition and the consequences of falsity
at the investigation's "very linchpin" (evidence of dumping).99
In Shanghai Foreign Trade Enterprises Co. v. United States, the CIT reviewed the DOC's
affirmative final antidumping duty determination concerning non-malleable cast iron pipe
fitting from China. 00 The CIT first held that the DOC had improperly used non-industry-
specific data obtained from the Reserve Bank of India to calculate surrogate values for
selling, general and administrative expenses, factory overhead, and profit. 1°" The record
contained a better source-the financial data of Indian producers of merchandise compa-
rable to the subject imports. Moreover, the CIT held that the DOC had improperly used
Indian import statistics to value the cost of foundry pig iron because the DOC did not
explain its departure from prior norms. 02 The prior norms were to use import statistics
only after concluding that they were based on commercially and statistically significant
quantities. 103
In Timken Co. v. United States, °4 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
held that a statute05 prohibiting parties from bringing claims directly against the govern-
ment for acting inconsistently with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act did not prevent
the CAFC from hearing the appeal because the CAFC could interpret the U.S. law under
which the claim was brought so as to avoid a conflict with international obligations.06 The
DOC also properly zeroed any negative dumping margins because its zeroing practice arose
from a permissible construction of the statutory definition of "dumping margin" 0' as "the
amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of
the subject merchandise." °0
Moreover, a WTO Appellate Body decision""9 holding that zeroing did not constitute a
"fair comparison" between export price and constructed export price under the Anti-
Dumping Duty Agreement, did not mandate an analogous result in the DOC case because
the WTO decision did not bind the United States and involved an investigation rather
than an administrative review. 10 In addition, the DOC properly applied the adverse-facts-
available rate to the entered value as opposed to the sales because (1) further manufacturing
97. Tung Fong Indus. Co. v. United States, 318 E Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
98. See id. at 1326.
99. See id. at 1333.
100. Shanghai Foreign Trade Enters. Co. v. United States, 318 E Supp. 2d 1339 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1351-53.
104. Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (2004) (barring certain direct claims against the government).
106. See Timken, 354 F3d at 1341.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (2004) (defining "dumping") (emphasis added).
108. See Timken, 354 E3d at 1343.
109. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, WT/DS/141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Antidumping Duties].
110. See Timken, 354 F3d at 1344-45 (finding the DOC's zeroing practice reasonable even in light of the
WTO decision).
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in the United States added significant value; (2) the DOC's method was consistent with
both the relevant regulation"' and prior case law;"' and (3) the method appropriately bal-
anced the goal of accuracy against the goal of inducing compliance." 3
In Jilin Henghe Pharmaceutical v. United States, the CIT held that once a final antidumping
determination has been invalidated, it cannot serve as a basis for the imposition of additional
duties.14 The DOC issued liquidation instructions directing Customs to liquidate Jilin
Henghe Pharmaceutical's entries of bulk aspirin pursuant to a previously invalidated anti-
dumping order. The CIT, however, found that the instructions did not reflect the finding
of a de minimis dumping margin, and there was no statutory foundation legitimatizing the
liquidation ofJilin's entries under the DOC's discredited determination." 5
In SNR Roulements v. United States,"6 the CIT upheld the DOC's practice of zeroing as
proper and found that the VTO case, EC-Bed Linen, was neither binding nor persuasive
in light of Commerce's longstanding use of converting negative dumping margins to zero.'
The CIT also found that the DOC's use of adverse facts is reasonable if the importer does
not cooperate fully or fails to show why its methodology for collecting facts is not distortive.
In Hontex Enterprises., Inc. v. United States, the CIT affirmed that the DOC could collapse
affiliated exporters in non-market economies like China, even though the governing reg-
ulations were directed at producers, not exporters."8 But the CIT held that the DOC's
decision to collapse two exporters was not supported by substantial evidence." 9
2. Countervailing Duty Cases: Commerce Determinations
In Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, the CAFC reviewed inconsistent findings by
the DOC in two remand determinations. 20 In each determination, the DOC applied a
different privatization methodology. The DOC's first remand determination applied the
same-person methodology and found that countervailable subsidies survived the privatiza-
tion of a French steel producer.'2' The DOC's second remand determination, by contrast,
found that countervailable duties did not survive privatization because an overwhelming
majority of those purchasing shares in the privatized entity had paid full market value, fair
market value, or even more for it, effectively offsetting the prior subsidy."2 The CAFC
111. 19 C.ER. § 351.212(b)(1) (2004) (stating how the DOC would calculate the assessment rate).
112. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 186 E Supp. 2d 1257, 1315 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) (finding
that the DOC could apply adverse facts available to entered value when further manufacturing occurred).
113. SeeTimken, 354 E3d at 1345-46.
114. Jilin Henghe Pharm. Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
115. See id. at 13. The court found that neither 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(c)(1) nor 1516a(e) provides such an
outcome.
116. SNR Roulements v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
117. See Antidumping Duties, supra note 109; see also Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, VT/DS264/AB/R (Apr. 13, 2004).
118. Hontex Enters., Inc. v. United States, 342 F Supp. 2d 1225 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
119. Id.
120. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 E3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A case separate from, yet
related to and argued concurrently with Allegheny Ludlum, and applying the same reasoning, was GTS Indus.
S.A. v. United States, 97 Fed. Appx. 333, (Fed. Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 1342.
122. See id. Note that after the CIT affirmed the DOC's second remand determination in 2002, a 2003
WTO appellate report found that the same-person test violated the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. So in
2003, the DOC replaced it, prospectively, with a privatization methodology that examined instead the terms
and conditions of the change in ownership, including whether the new owners had paid fair market value for
the privatized business. See id. at 1342-43.
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upheld the DOC's findings, holding that (1) the DOC must not apply "a per se rule in
disguise" such as the same-person methodology'23 and (2) the CIT's second remand order
properly focused on the particulars of privatization.14
Similarly, in AG der Dillinger Hiittenwerke v. United States, the CIT held that the DOC's
same-person methodology was illegal. 2' In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, the CIT
found that the DOC violated an agreement with the Brazilian Government to suspend a
countervailing duty investigation of hot-rolled, flat-rolled, carbon-quality steel from Bra-
zil.126 The DOC violated the agreement by failing to meet with the domestic producers for
two and a half years after signing the agreement, and then meeting with the domestic
producers only two weeks before the DOC filed its final amended remand results with the
CIT.'27 Furthermore, the DOC failed to address the extent of the domestic industry's op-
position or why the CIT should prefer the DOC's judgment on the industry's best interests
over the judgment of the industry itself.2'
3. Antidumping Cases: International Trade Commission Determinations
In Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the ITC terminated its inves-
tigation as to subject imports from Egypt, South Africa, and Venezuela after finding those
imports to be negligible in its preliminary determination. 29 After the DOC amended the
antidumping investigation's scope to cover subject imports from Egypt, South Africa, and
Venezuela, the CIT ordered a remand and a negligibility determination.13 The CAFC held
that the CIT erred in doing so because the ITC had properly based its original preliminary
determination on the facts as they existed at the time of the vote.'
In Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, the CIT held that the affirmative injury determi-
nation on Japanese imports was unsupported by substantial evidence and, thus, compels a
negative material injury determination. 32 The court concluded that further reconsideration
would be futile because the ITC was unable to obtain new evidence to significantly sup-
plement the record for several reasons, including the passage of time. 3 3 The court consid-
ered whether to leave the issue of reopening the record for further investigation to the
ITC's discretion, as it ordinarily would, particularly because non-subject imports were not
fully studied in this case. Here, the court believed such information would not change the
result, and it would not be fair to parties involved to delay the matter further.31 The court
remanded the issue with instructions to issue a negative material injury determination."'
123. See id. at 1345-48.
124. See id. at 1348-49. In a concluding dictum, the CAFC also cast doubt on the second remand deter-
mination's assumption that the statute required the DOC to ascribe each subsidy's benefit either to the company
or to its new purchasers, but never to both. Absent argument from any party, however, this inadequacy in the
DOC's reasoning did not, according to the CAFC, necessitate disturbing the DOC's second remand analysis.
See id. at 1349-50.
125. AG der Dillinger Hiittenwerke v. United States, 310 F Supp. 2d 1347, 1357-58 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
126. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
127. See id. at 1313.
128. See id. at 1320-22.
129. Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 357 F3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
130. See id. at 1302.
131. See id. at 1309-17.
132. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 350 E Supp. 2d 1186 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1222.
135. Id.
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4. TAA and NAFTA-TAA Cases
In two cases, the CAFC held that statements from company officials constituted sub-
stantial evidence supporting Labor's negative determination, as long as the statements were
creditworthy and the other evidence did not contradict them.'1 6 But in Former Employees of
Tyco Electronics v. U.S. Department of Labor, the CIT held that when such statements were
contradicted by other information, the government's position was no longer substantially
justified. 3
5. CAFC Byrd Amendment Case
In Candle Corporation of America v. U.S. International Trade Commission, the CAFC held
that a company that initially declined to support the original antidumping petition and later
expressly opposed it could not seek distributions under the Byrd Amendment, even if it
subsequently acquired almost all the assets of two entities that had supported the petition. 3 '
6. CIT Preliminary Injunction Cases
On December 30, 2004, the CIT issued a preliminary injunction in U.S. Association of
Importers of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, which enjoined the Committee for the
Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) from considering or acting on any threat
based petitions for the imposition of "Special Textile Safeguard" quotas on textile and ap-
parel articles from the People's Republic of China.'39 OnJanuary 1, 2005, all quotas on the
importation of textile and apparel products made in WTO member countries were elimi-
nated pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreements.140 Under China's Protocol on Accession
to the WTO, however, the United States retained the authority to impose temporary
textile-specific safeguard measures on Chinese imports if circumstances warranted such an
imposition.' 4' In May 2003, CITA initially stated that safeguard requests must be based on
actual market disruption, but it later determined that safeguards could be based only on a
threat of a possible surge in imports.
42
Beginning in October 2004, the CITA agreed to consider twelve threat-based petitions,
which alleged the threat of market disruption rather than actual market disruption. 43 The
136. See Former Employees of Barry Callebaut v. Chao, 357 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that
company officials' creditworthy, uncontradicted, sworn affidavits constituted substantial evidence); Former
Employees of Marathon Ashland Pipe Line LLC v. Chao, 370 E3d 1375, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding, inter
alia, that Labor properly based its negative adjustment assistance determination on statements of company
officials, because the Secretary reasonably concluded that those statements were creditworthy and not contra-
dicted by other evidence).
137. Fomer Employees of Tyco Elec. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 350 E Supp. 2d 1075 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
138. Candle Corp. of Am. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 374 E3d 1087, 1089-1090 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
139. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, 350 E Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004).
140. See GATT Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (Apr. 15, 1994); see also
19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994) (codifying approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements).
141. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 10 November 2001, WT/L1432; see also
World Trade Organization, Mfinisterial Conference of 13 November 2001, $ 241-42, 342, WT/MIN(01)/3/
Add.2.
142. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles and Apparel, 350 F Supp. 2d at 1342.
143. Id. at 1346. The petitions originated from members of the American Manufacturing Trade Action
Coalition, which represents U.S. textile makers, labor unions, and other similar trade groups.
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Court found that because the CITA accepted mere threat-based requests, the Association
had shown both permanent economic loss and irreparable harm to business practices. 44 In
contrast, the CITA will still be able to effectively administer the textile-specific safeguards
guaranteed by China's Accession Agreement. 45
B. COMMERCE AND ITC DETERMINATIONS
1. Softwood Lumber from Canada
The DOC issued a revised final affirmative countervailing duty determination with re-
spect to softwood lumber products from Canada as a result of the WTO Appellate Body's
review of the DOC's earlier final determination.- The DOC also issued final results in
the antidumping and countervailing duty administrative reviews of softwood lumber from
Canada. In its antidumping duty review for May 2002 through April 2003, the DOC issued
weighted-average margins ranging from 1.83 percent to 10.50 percent. 147 In its counter-
vailing duty review for imports made. during the same period, the DOC issued a country-
wide ad valorem subsidy rate of 17.18 percent for all Canadian producers and exporters of
the merchandise under review. 48 As part of its final results in the countervailing duty review,
the DOC found that four respondents received either zero or de minimis net subsidies during
the period reviewed, and it also rescinded its review with respect to seven respondents.
2. Shrimp from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Fietnam
In the antidumping duty investigations of frozen and warm-water canned shrimp from
Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, the DOC investigated a large num-
ber of respondents and reviewed critical circumstances allegations made by petitioners for
all the countries except Brazil and Ecuador. 49
3. Pure Magnesium from Canada
The DOC revoked the antidumping duty order on pure magnesium from Canada after
an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) reviewed issues raised by a prior NAFTA
Binational Panel, and the United States requested the formation of an ECC to review
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1349. The Association also questioned whether CITs delegated authority to administer textile
agreements includes the authority to issue regulations pursuant to China's Accession Agreement. If successful
on the merits, CITAs China Textile Safeguard Regulations could be invalidated. Because of the limited scope
of the preliminary injunction, the Court did not rule on this question. See id. at 1350.
146. Notice of Implementation Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; Countervailing
Measures Concerning Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 69 Fed. Reg. 75305-02 (Dec. 16,
2004).
147. Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Notice of Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Review: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 69
Fed. Reg. 7592 1-01 (Dec. 20, 2004).
148. Notice of Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Rescission of Certain
Company-Specific Reviews: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 69 Fed. Reg. 75917-01 (Dec.
20, 2004).
149. International Trade Administration Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: Initiation ofAntidumping Duty
Investigations, available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/0104/shrimp-012104.html (last visitedJune
12, 2005).
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certain issues raised by the Panel. 50 Although the ECC found that the Panel had manifestly
exceeded its powers by failing to apply the correct standard of review, the ECC went on to
conclude that the Panel's actions did not pose a threat to the integrity of the binational
review process. It affirmed the Panel's decision.''
4. Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China
In the antidumping duty investigation of wooden bedroom furniture from China, the
DOC calculated margins ranging from de minimis to 198.08 percent for those respondents
that were individually investigated, and a rate of 8.64 percent for the 115 firms qualifying
for separate rates treatment.'52 During the final phase of its investigation, all six Commis-
sioners of the ITC found that imports from China were causing material injury to the U.S.
industry, and an antidumping duty order was subsequently issued. 3
C. NAFTA BINATIONAL PANEL DECISIONS
1. Softwood Lumber From Canada-Countervailing Duty Determination
Following a prior decision by the Panel remanding the case to the DOC to redetermine
the benefit, the DOC issued its Remand Determination on January 12, 2004.114 Subse-
quently on June 7, 2004, the Panel rendered a second decision, remanding the matter to
the Investigating Authority to address certain issues and redetermine the benefit, if any."5
After reviewing the statutory and regulatory basis for the appropriate methodology, the
Panel considered arguments relating to the Investigating Authority's use of private log
prices and determined it would not disturb the DOC's finding that private log prices are
useable as benchmarks.5 6 The Panel also considered the use of cross-border benchmarks,
and upheld the DOC's rejection of cross-border comparisons" 7 finding that the rejection
of export prices is not contrary to law." 8 In an extensive discussion of benchmark calcula-
tions, particularly relating to the various Canadian provinces, the Panel directed the DOC
to recalculate the benchmark price for stumpage, taking into account the actual market
150. Pure Magnesium From Canada; Notice of NAFTA Binational Panel's Final Decision, Amended Final
Results of Full Sunset Review and Revocation of Antidumping Duty Order, 69 Fed. Reg. 70649-02 (Dec. 7,
2004).
151. Id.
152. Chinese Bedroom Furniture Dumped on U.S.Market, Commerce Says (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://
hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/trade/general/doc/2004/110901 .hun.
153. George R. Tuttle, Commerce Issues Antidumping Order and Revisions and Revisions to Final Determination
in Case on Wooden Bedroom Furniture From China (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.tutdelaw.com/news
letters; International Trade Administration Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: Final Determination in the Anti-
dumping Duty Investigation on Imports of Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People's Republic of China, available at
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov.uscn/trade/general/doc2004/110901.htm (last visited June 12, 2005).
154. International Trade Administration Office of Public Affairs, Remand Determination: Implementing a
NAFTA PanelDecision, availableathttp://www.ita.doc.gov/media/factsheet/OlO4lumber-O 11204.html (last vis-
ited June 12, 2005).
155. See Second Remand Determination, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Productisfrom Canada: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, NAFTA Binational Panel Review, Secretariat File No. USA-
CDA-2002- 1904-03 at 33-34, available at ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/usa-cda-2002- 1904-03-cvd.pdf (last visited
June 12, 2005).
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id. at 12.
158. Id. at 13.
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conditions that govern the sale of timber in British Columbia and Ontario. 1 9 The Panel
required the DOC to redo its benchmark calculations for Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba,
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. 160 After considering profit adjustment issues,
the Panel remanded the question of the proper profit adjustment for all provinces.' 6' Finally,
the Panel considered numerator and denominator issues, as well as company exclusions.
Following remand, the DOC issued its Second Remand Determination and the Panel
issued its Decision on Second Remand.62 Finding that the DOC addressed each of the
issues previously remanded by the Panel, but noting the considerable controversy regarding
the results of its consideration, the Panel discussed the issues according to province. 163
2. Softwood Lumber From Canada Injury Determination
In another decision issued in 2004 with respect to softwood lumber, the NAFTA Bina-
tional Panel rejected the ITC's remand determination that the U.S. industry was threatened
with material injury by reason of imports of softwood lumber from Canada found to be
subsidized and sold in the United States at less than fair value.M The Panel determined
that the ITC remand determination that the domestic softwood lumber industry is threat-
ened with material injury was not in accordance with law and is not supported by substantial
evidence.
In its decision, the Panel did find that the ITC's remand determination that "square-end
bed frame components and flangestock are part of a continuum of softwood lumber prod-
ucts defined as a single domestic like product is in accordance with the law and supported
by substantial evidence." r65 But the Panel determined that the ITC's finding that the subject
imports are "likely to have a significant price-depressing or suppressing effect on domestic
prices in the imminent future is not supported by substantial evidence" and that "subject
imports would increase substantially in the imminent future is, likewise, not supported by
substantial evidence." Thus, the Panel found the ITC's "remand determination that the
domestic softwood lumber industry is threatened with material injury by reason of subsi-
dized imports and dumped imports from Canada to be not supported by substantial evi-
dence." 16 The Panel remanded to the ITC the Remand Determination of Threat of Injury
dated December 15, 2003, and directed the ITC to "conduct its threat of injury analysis
consistent with the ... conclusions of the Panel."167
After the ITC issued its Second Remand Determination, it was reviewed by the Panel,
which subsequently rejected the ITC's determination that the U.S. industry was threatened
159. Id. at 19.
160. Id. at 21-25.
161. Id. at 27.
162. See Decision of the Panel on Second Remand, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, NAFTA Binational Panel Review, Secretariat File
No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/can-usa/
trade-softwoodlumber_ 120104.pdf.
163. Id. at 13-24.
164. Remand Decision of the Panel, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final
Affirmative Threat ofInjury Determination, NAFTA Binantional Panel Review, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-
2002-1904-07, at 51-52 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/nafa/englishuc02190407be.
asp.
165. Id. at 6.
166. Id. at 44.
167. Id.
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with material injury by reason of imports of softwood lumber from Canada found to be
subsidized and sold in the United States at less than fair value. The Panel remanded the
case to the ITC for it to make a determination consistent with the decision of this Panel
that the evidence on the record does not support a finding of material threat and to make
that determination within ten days from the date of the Panel's decision. 68
The Panel held that in its Second Remand Determination the ITC relied on the same
record evidence the Panel had twice before held insufficient as a matter of law to support
the ITC's affirmative threat finding and concluded that, by so doing, the Panel could rea-
sonably conclude there is no other record evidence to support the ITC's affirmative threat
determination.169 The Panel determined that this case is one of those "rare circumstances"
where a remand is not warranted.7 0 Accordingly, the Panel remanded the case to the ITC
to make a determination consistent with the decision of the Panel that the evidence on the
record does not support a finding of threat of material injury. The determination had to
be made no later than ten days from the date of the Panel decision.' 7
3. Pure Magnesium From Canada
In response to a request, the ECC convened to render a decision and order dismissing
the challenge and affirming the Panel decision.'72 The basis for the challenge from the U.S.
government was that the Panel "had manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdic-
tion and seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure and violated the standard
of review."' 73 In its review of whether the three-prong test had been satisfied, the ECC held
that (1) the Panel had failed to apply the correct standard of review and manifestly exceeded
its powers, meeting the first prong of article 1904.13, and (2) the Panel's failure to apply
the correct standard of review materially affected its decision, meeting the second prong of
the challenge test.'74 The ECC, however, was unable to find that the Panel failed to apply
U.S. law. Consequently, the ECC found that the Panel's decision did not threaten the
integrity of the binational review process and, thus, the third prong of the extraordinary
challenge test had not been met.175
V. Legislative Activity
In 2004, the 108th Congress adjourned after a flurry of legislative activity on a number
of substantive trade bills. In particular, Congress approved several major pieces of trade
legislation, including the implementation of legislation for the U.S.-Australia and U.S.-
168. See Second Remand Decision of the Panel, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Prductsfrom Canada:
Final Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination, NAFTA Binational Panel Review, Secretariat File No. USA-
CDA-2002-1904-07, at 7 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/nafta/English/uc021904 0 7
ce.asp.
169. Id. at2.
170. See id. at5.
171. Id. at 13.
172. See Decision and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee, In the Matter of Pure Magnesium
from Canada, Secretariat File No. ECC-2003-1904-OIUSA at 11 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/dispute/nafta/english/ecc03 190401 e.asp.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 10.
VOL. 39, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 229
Morocco Free Trade Agreements, the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, the African Growth and
Opportunity Act, and the repeal of the Extraterritorial Income Tax Exclusion Act. In ad-
dition, Congress introduced several new bills for consideration concerning the Byrd Amend-
ment, China, country of origin labeling, the imposition of countervailing duties on non-
market economy country imports, the Ukraine Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR),
and Super 301. Congress, however, failed to pass several pieces of legislation from the
previous year, including bills on sanctions reform, the Export Administration Act, the Russia
PNTR and the WTO Dispute Rulings Commission.
A. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Following the signing of the U.S.-Australia FTA, the Bush Administration sought the
immediate passage for the FTA implementing legislation before Congress adjourned in
August 2004.176 On July 14, 2004, the House of Representatives easily approved the imple-
menting legislation by a vote of 314 to 109, despite concerns over the FTA's provision
concerning the re-importation of pharmaceuticals.' The U.S. Senate followed suit on
July 15, 2004 when it approved the implementing bill by a vote of eighty to sixteen.'78 On
August 3, 2004, President Bush signed the U.S.-Australia FTA Implementation Act into
law. 17
9
With congressional approval of the U.S.-Australia FTA, efforts to pass the U.S.-Morocco
FTA before the summer recess gained momentum.s" After negotiations began in January
2003, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Minister Delegate of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation Taib Fassi-Fihri signed the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement on June
15, 2004.111 On July 21, 2004, the U.S. Senate approved the FTA without any controversy
by an eighty-five to thirteen vote.' 2 The House approved the agreement with a similarly
strong show of support on July 22, 2004, by a vote of 323 to 99.183 President Bush signed
the legislation into law on August 17, 2004.114
Although the Australia and Morocco FTAs sailed through the House and Senate, the
CAFTA encountered more serious obstacles. The Bush Administration signed a FTA with
the five Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and
Guatemala on May 28, 2004, and with the Dominican Republic on August 5, 2004.185
176. See Zoellick Looks for Australia FTA Approval, before August Recess, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 2004, at
§ 21, available at 2004 WLNR 79851.
177. See House Easily Approves Australia FTA, Drug Provisions Draw Fire, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 16, 2004,
at § 29, available at 2004 WLNR 81800.
178. See Senate Approves Australia FTA, Morocco Deal Next In Line, INSmE U.S. TRADE, July 16, 2004, at § 29,
available at 2004 WLNR 81808.
179. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-286 (2004).
180. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert
B. Zoellick Following House Approval of Morocco Free Trade Agreement (July 22, 2004), available at http://
www.USTR.gov [hereinafter Zoellick Statement].
181. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Morocco Sign Historic Free
Trade Agreement (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.USTR.gov [hereinafter Historic FTA.
182. See House, Senate Approve Morocco FTA Witb Strong Bipartisan Votes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 23, 2004,
at § 30, available at 2004 VLNR 81925.
183. Zoellick Statement, supra note 180.
184. See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-302 (2004);
see also Historic FTA, supra note 181.
185. See Hill Watch: Central America FTA, 21 Iscr'L TRADE REp. (BNA), No. 28, at 1166 (July 8, 2004).
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Unlike the strong congressional support for the Australia and Morocco FTAs, by the end
of the year, neither the House nor the Senate had introduced implementing legislation for
the CAFTA. The agreement's labor and environmental provisions drew heavy criticism
from several congressional members. 86 For its part, the Bush Administration did not seek
to push for the CAFTA's passage before the 2004 presidential elections. 7
B. MISCELLANEOUs TRADE AND TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 2004
One year after the House approved the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections
Act of 2004 (MTTC), the Senate finally passed its own version on March 4, 2004.188 On
October 8, 2004, the House passed the conference report after making an agreement that
concerned repealing the 1916 Antidumping Act.'8 9 Certain House members supported a
prospective repeal of the 1916 Antidumping Act, meaning that it would not eliminate pend-
ing cases under the law. 90 But other members advocated a repeal that would end all existing
court cases. 191 The two sides reached an agreement whereby the final conference report
included a prospective repeal of the 1916 Antidumping Act, yet also granted Mauritius a
one-year designation as a least-developed country under the African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (AGOA) effective October 1, 2004.192
On the Senate side, the bill stalled once again. In mid-October 2004, the Senate faced
another roadblock and adjourned without approving the conference report. 9 Senators Russ
Feingold (D-WI) and Herbert Kohl (D-WI) opposed a provision in the bill granting per-
manent, MFN status to Laos because of alleged governmental human rights violations
against the Hmong.' 94 It appeared that Congress would once again fail to pass the bill.
However, on November 17, 2004, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) filed a cloture
motion to force a vote on the bill. 99 Finally, on November 19, 2004, the Senate approved
the conference report with an eighty-eight to five vote-Congress had finally passed the
MTTC. 196 President Bush signed the bill into law on December 3, 2004.197
While the MTTC primarily reduces or eliminates import duties, it also contains a num-
ber of additional trade policy provisions. The legislation annually grants renewable normal
trade relations to Laos, repeals the 1916 Antidumping Act, grants most-favored nation
status to Armenia, extends GSP benefits to allow duty-free entry for hand-knotted and
186. See Grassley, Blunt Want CAFTA Passage In Possible Lame Duck Session, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,July 30,2004,
at § 31, available at 2004 WLNR 82162.
187. Id.
188. See Hill Watch: Miscellaneous Trade Bill, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 28, at 1164 (July 8,2004).
189. See Senate Holds Block Passage of Tariff Bill with 1916 AD Act Repeal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 15, 2004,






195. See Miscellaneous TariffBill Set fr Passage After Cloture Filed, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2004, at§ 47,
available at 2004 WLNR 10906228.
196. See Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Approved, Supporters Seek New Approach, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 26, 2004,
at § 48, available at 2004 WLNR 12408881.
197. See Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 118 Stat. 2434
(2004).
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hand-woven carpets, contains numerous textile and apparel provisions, and amends the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) to allow duty-free imports on certain
CBERA-origin footwear.19
C. AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT
The African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2004 (2004 AGOA) was signed into law by
President Bush on July 13, 2004.19' The law expands the current African Growth and Op-
portunity Act (AGOA) by providing trade benefits in several important areas for beneficiary
sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, the 2004 AGOA extends overall preferential
access for imports from its current expiration date of 2008 until 2015. The legislation also
extends the third-country fabric provision for three years to September 30, 2007. In years
one and two, the cap would remain at the full current level and would be phased down by
50 percent in year three. °°
In addition, the 2004 AGOA contains additional congressional guidance for the admin-
istration on the bill. A statement of congressional policy provides that the administration
should interpret the AGOA textile and apparel provisions in a broad and trade-expanding
manner with the purpose of maximizing opportunities for African imports. The bill also
expands current eligibility to allow duty preferences on apparel imports containing foreign-
origin (non-AGOA) collars, cuffs, drawstrings, padding/shoulder pads, and waistbands.
Lastly, an amendment to the 2004 AGOA under the MTTC grants lesser-developed ben-
eficiary country status to Mauritius. As a result, the country may use third-country fabric
and yarn in apparel wholly assembled in Mauritius and still enter the United States duty-
free up to a certain limit.21
D. TRADE PREFERENCES
In 2004, Congress continued its efforts to grant duty preferences to Ukraine, Haiti and
the Middle East. On March 11, 2004, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and Representative
Sander Levin (D-MI) introduced bills seeking to extend PNTR status to Ukraine.2 2 But
Congress adjourned without acting on the bill.
On July 16, 2004, the Senate passed legislation to increase duty-free access for Haitian
apparel products. 23 The Senate bill provided duty-free entry, subject to an annual cap, for
Haitian, wholly assembled or knit-to-shape apparel items regardless of the country of origin
of the fabrics, components, or yarns used in production.2 0° The House, however, failed to
pass their version of the bill due to a lack of assurances that the Senate would accept the
198. Id.
199. See Press Release, Office of the White House, President Bush Signs African Growth and Opportunity
Act (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See To authorize the extension of unconditional and permanent nondiscriminatory treatnent to the
products of Ukraine, S. 2205 & H.R. 3958, 108th Cong. (2004).
203. See Senate Passes Legislation to Extend Additional Textile Trade Benefits to Haiti, 21 Ir'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 30, at 1242 (July 22, 2004).
204. See House Fails to Pass Haiti Apparel Bill in Face of Republican, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 26, 2004, at § 48,
available at 2004 WLNR 12408930.
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bill.205 Senators from textile states opposed the House bill out of concern that it would harm
the U.S. textile industry. 06 Ranking Member Charles Rangel (D-NY) vowed to make an-
other effort in 2005.207
Furthermore, legislation introduced in 2003 to extend duty-free market access for im-
ports from the "greater Middle East" failed to gain much ground in 2004.20 On March 10,
2004, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the bill introduced by Senators
Max Baucus (D-MT) and John McCain (R-AZ). But the Committee never acted upon the
proposed bill.
Lastly, bills introduced in 2003 to grant PNTR status to Russia again failed to move
forward in 2004. United States pressure on Russia for greater market access for telecom-
munications and financial services and stronger protection of intellectual property rights
continued to impede efforts to grant PNTR status to Russia.2n9
E. EXTRATERRITORIAL INCOME TAX EXCLUSION ACT REPEAL
On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law legislation repealing export tax
breaks under the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act's (ETIA) tax provisions. 210 The
legislation responded to a January 2002 WTO finding that the ETIA constituted a pro-
hibited export subsidy. Subsequently, the United States faced close to four billion dollars
in trade sanctions by the EU if it failed to comply with the WTO ruling."' On March 1,
2004, the EU started to impose additional duties on certain U.S. exports to Europe starting
at 5 percent, with monthly increases of 1 percent. 12 With pressure building, repealing the
ETIA became one of Congress' highest priorities in 2004.111 On May 11, 2004, the Senate
approved its bill (S. 1637) with a ninety-two to five vote, and the House passed its version
of the bill (H.R. 4520) onJune 17, 2004 with a 251 to 178 vote. 214
The legislation repealing the ETIA is contained in the American Jobs Creation Act.2"'
Under the law, companies face a gradual reduction in ETI benefits from 100 percent in
2004, 80 percent in 2005, and 60 percent in 2006. The law simultaneously phases in a
new tax deduction on all domestic manufacturing activity. In addition, the bill includes






208. See Middle East Trade and Engagement Act of 2003, H.R. 2267 & S. 1121, 108th Cong. (2004).
209. See Hill Watch: Russia PNTR, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 28, at 1165 (July 8, 2004).
210. See Press Release, Office of the White House, The AmericanJobs Creation Act of 2004 (Oct. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
211. Export Tax Repeal Heads 2004 Priority List for Congress Deadline Looms, Panel says, 21 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA), No. 1, at 22 (Jan. 1, 2004).
212. See Council Regulations (EC) 2193/2003 Establishing Additional Customs Duties on Imports of Cer-
tain Products Originating in the United States of America, 2003 Oj. (L 328) 3, available at http://www.
martinlittle.com/publications/Sanctions.reg.pdf.
213. See Export Tax, supra note 211.
214. See Senate Passes Export Tax Repeal; New Shelter Promoter Penalties Added, 21 IN-T'L TRADE REp.
(BNA), No. 20, at 806 (May 13, 2004); Obstacles, Tobacco Buyout Loom Over Conference On Bills to Repeal
Export Tax, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 25, at 1061 (June 24, 2004).
215. AmericanJobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
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F ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
Congress introduced two important pieces of legislation in 2004 concerning antidumping
and countervailing duty law. In January 2004, Representative Phil English (R-PA) intro-
duced legislation (H.R. 3716) thatwould provide for the imposition of countervailing duties
on imports from non-market economies, including China and Vietnam. 217 Senator Susan
Collins (R-Maine) sponsored a companion Senate bill (S. 2212) on March 12, 2004.218
These bills, which were aimed primarily at Chinese imports, sought to reverse a DOC
policy, under which countervailing duty law does not apply to imports from non-market
economies because of the difficulty in accurately calculating subsidies in such markets.
Congress took no action on these bills.?19
On March 11, 2004, Representative Jim Ramstad (R-MN) introduced legislation seeking
to repeal the Byrd Amendment.22° Under the Byrd Amendment, duties collected from anti-
dumping and countervailing orders that previously went into the general U.S. Treasury,
are given to affected domestic producers. In January 2003, the VVTO ruled these Byrd
payments illegal. The Byrd Amendment, however, continues to have strong support in the
Senate. 221 Yet Congress took no action on the proposed measure.
G. CHINA
Congressional attention on China focused on concerns over currency and textiles. On
July 22, 2004, several members of Congress introduced new legislation titled the Currency
Rate Adjustment and Trade Enforcement Act (H.R. 4986) that would require the Treasury
Secretary to analyze whether China's exchange rate policies create an international trade
advantage that would not otherwise exist if the renminbi were set by market forces.222 The
legislation calls for increased duties on Chinese imports to offset the impact of any under-
valued currency. Congress adjourned without acting on the proposed bill.
In the area of textiles, various House members introduced the Textiles and Apparel China
Safeguard Act (H.R. 5026) on September 8, 2004.223 The bill directs the DOC to provide
relief in cases where imports of textiles or apparel products of Chinese origin are threatening
to impede trade in such products, including instances where Chinese finished products are
hurting imported products made outside the United States with U.S.-origin textiles and
apparel components. If imports fall under a safeguard action, the bill directs the Adminis-
tration to immediately reach an agreement with China on the imposition of quotas. If an
agreement cannot be reached, then the bill calls for the automatic imposition of quotas. In
addition, the bill responds to mounting concern over the impact of China's textile imports
on the U.S. textile industry that were anticipated to increase dramatically after the elimi-
nation of textile quotas on January 1, 2005. But Congress never acted upon the legislation.
217. See Members of Congress Seek to Apply Anti-Subsidy Trade Remedies to China, 21 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 15, at 613 (Apr. 8, 2004).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Ramstad Introduces Bill to Repeal Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 21 INrT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA), No. 12, at 502 (Mar. 18, 2004).
221. See EU Official Urges Byrd Repeal; Congressional Action Unlikely This Year, 21 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 37, at 1497 (Sept. 16, 2004).
222. Currency Rate Adjustment and Trade Enforcement Act, H.R. 4986, 108th Cong. (2004).
223. Textiles and Apparel China Safeguard Act, H.R. 5026, 108th Cong. (2004).
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H. MISCELLANEOUS TRADE LEGISLATION
Congress failed to revive the Super 301 program, under which the United States inves-
tigated foreign trade practices that violated trade agreements or restricted U.S. trade. A bill
to replace a mandatory country of origin labeling program, due to be enacted in September
2006, with a voluntary program for meat, fish, and perishable agricultural products lan-
guished on the House floor.114 Another bill for the establishment of a Congressional Ad-
visory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement to review all WTO dispute settlement
decisions adversely affecting the United States suffered the same fate.225 Similarly, Congress
failed to move on certain pieces of legislation seeking reform of U.S. sanctions laws, such
as a bill introduced in May 2004, providing for the expiration of certain trade and travel
restrictions against Cuba unless annually renewed by C6ngress.2 6 Finally, Congress failed
to reauthorize the Export Administration Act, easing export controls because of national
security concerns. 27 Existing authority for export controls continued to be exercised under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.22
224. See Food Promotion Act of 2004, H.R. 4576, 108th Cong. (2004); see also Bill Creating Voluntary
Labeling Program Introduced by House Agriculture Committee, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 25, at 1010
(June 17, 2004).
225. SeeTrade Law Reform Act 2003, H.R. 2365, 108th Cong. (2004).
226. See Cuba Sanctions Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 4457 & S. 2449, 108th Cong. (2004); see also Lawmakers
Introduce Bill Requiring Congressional Approval of Cuba Sanctions, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 22, at
911 (May 27, 2004).
227. See Juster Says DOC Wants New EAA, But No Administration Decision Yet, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 14,
2004, at § 52, available at 2004 WLNR 14632636; Business Debates Recommending Bush Seek New Export Control
Bill, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 17, 2004, at § 51, available at 2004 WLNR 14261088.
228. See Juster, supra note 227.
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